The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and State-Building Strategy After 2017: A Study on Dilemmas and Employment Fundamentals

Abstract

This study examines the strategic role of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and resistance factions in the post-2017 era, following the military victory over the terrorist organization ISIS. It tests a hypothesis centered on the feasibility of employing these supportive fighting forces to enhance Iraq's state-building strategy without compromising the national security of neighboring regional states. The research problem stems from the prevailing state of uncertainty and security concerns surrounding the future role of the PMF, particularly amidst the escalating geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran on Iraqi soil, alongside the division of armed formations between an official state body linked to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and philosophically and administratively independent resistance factions.

The study analyzes the emerging combat doctrine and the determinants of institutionalizing security across two functional levels that monitor internal polarization and regional power balances. Within this framework, the researcher proposes a structural model for distributing security tasks among the Army, Internal Security/Intelligence Forces, and the PMF to ensure comprehensive deterrence and territory-holding capability. The study concludes that the optimal strategic employment of the PMF lies in transitioning it from a revolutionary military organization based on mass mobilization into a professional military institution subject to civil institutional regulations. This transition requires severing partisan and ideological ties and ensuring a smooth transition for other factions into the political community to reinforce the pillars of stability and state-building.