الرفاه والحرمان والعملية الانتخابية «دراسة في دور ومكانة الاقتصاد بتوجيه سلوك الناخبين تجاه نخب السلطة السياسية»

Abstract

The research dealt with an important topic، which is economic welfare as a goal and a basic demand of the people. The elites of power must achieve it، as the group that pledged to achieve it upon receiving the reins of power and governance according to the social contract between the state represented by (the political elites) and the people، and when those elites are unable to achieve economic prosperity as if they were scattered. The contract is between them and the people، and they lost legitimacy because they remain in power and rule. Here، elections come as a tool to punish or reward those elites by excluding them or keeping them in power. Accordingly، we build a coherent relationship between economic prosperity and political elites and the election process. The more power elites achieve the economic well-being of the people، the more It has gained popular approval and consequently the possibility of re-electing them and، conversely، if the elites of power fail to achieve the economic welfare of the people، this will increase the popular rejection and discontent of those elites، and consequently their failure to re-elect them as a punishment for their negative performance in meeting the requirements of the people and satisfying their needs.